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Reinscribing De Quincey's Palimpsest: The Significance of The Palimpsest 
in Contemporary Literary and Cultural Studies 
 
Sarah Dillon 
 
In 1845, Thomas De Quincey published an essay entitled ‘The Palimpsest’. 
Coupling ‘palimpsest’ with the definite article ‘the’ (for the first time in a non-specific 
sense) De Quincey’s essay inaugurated – that is, both introduced, and initiated the 
subsequent use of – the substantive concept of the palimpsest. The palimpsest is 
implicitly related to palimpsests, which until 1845 were palaeographic oddities of 
concern only to those researching and publishing ancient manuscripts. However, the 
concept of the palimpsest also exists independently of such phenomena – it is a strange, 
new figurative entity, invested with the stature of the substantive. De Quincey was not 
the first writer to use palimpsests in a figurative sense.1 However, his inauguration of 
the concept of the palimpsest marks the beginning of a consistent process of 
metaphorisation of palimpsests from the mid-nineteenth century (the most prolific 
period of palimpsest discoveries) to the present day.  
Since 1845, the concept of the palimpsest has been employed in areas as diverse 
as architecture, geography, geology, palaeontology, glaciology, astrophysics, 
biochemistry, genetics, neuroscience, neurobiology, neurocomputing, and information 
technology. It also occurs frequently in creative, critical and theoretical texts across the 
expansive fields of literature, philosophy and cultural studies. This essay brings together 
some of those diverse texts – beginning with De Quincey’s – in order to draw attention 
to how the palimpsest is reinscribed in and by a broad range of contemporary critical 
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discourses, including deconstruction, psychoanalysis, postcolonial theory, feminism and 
queer theory. Moreover, the structure and logic of the palimpsest is crucial to these 
discourses’ rethinking of such key contemporary issues as the subject, time, history, 
culture, gender and sexuality, and the processes of reading and writing themselves. As I 
explore in the conclusion with my coupling of queer and the palimpsest, the movement 
of elucidation here is reciprocal and simultaneous: the palimpsest reifies and aids the 
understanding of current ideas and concepts; at the same time, those ideas and concepts 
enable a reinscription of the palimpsest that sophisticates our understanding of its 
complex structure and logic.   
 
 
Introducing ‘Palimpsestuousness’ 
 
Before discussing the significance of the concept of the palimpsest in current 
critical discourse, I would like to introduce the neologistic adjective from the 
palimpsest: ‘palimpsestuous’. This is an adjective that has gained critical currency in 
recent years, and that I will employ throughout this essay as a shorthand for the logic 
and structure of the palimpsest that is so crucial to contemporary literary and cultural 
discourse.  
In the Oxford English Dictionary, a palimpsest is defined as,  
 
a parchment or other writing-material written upon twice, the original 
writing having been erased or rubbed out to make place for the second; a 
manuscript in which a later writing is written over an effaced earlier writing.  
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Palimpsests were created from the seventh to fifteenth centuries primarily in the 
scriptoriums of the great monastic institutions such as Bobbio, Luxeuil, Fleury, Corbie 
and St. Gall. Such recycling of vellum arose due to a combination of factors: scarcity 
and expense of writing material; physical deterioration of existing manuscripts from 
which reusable vellum was then sourced; and, changing historical and cultural factors 
which rendered some texts obsolete either because the language in which they were 
written could no longer be read, or because their content was no longer valued. 
Palimpsests were created by a process of layering whereby the existing text was erased, 
using various chemical methods, and the new text was written over the old one. But the 
most peculiar and interesting fact about palimpsests is omitted from the OED definition. 
Palimpsests are of such interest to subsequent generations because although the first 
writing on the vellum seemed to have been eradicated after treatment, it was often 
imperfectly erased. Its ghostly trace then reappeared in the following centuries as the 
iron in the remaining ink reacted with the oxygen in the air producing a reddish brown 
oxide. This process has been encouraged by the use of chemical reagents and ultra-
violet light in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and by more advanced 
imaging technologies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Although the process that creates palimpsests is one of layering, the result of 
that process is a surface structure which can be described by a term coined by Thomas 
De Quincey – ‘involuted’. ‘Involute’ is De Quincey’s name for the way in which 
 
our deepest thoughts and feelings pass to us through perplexed combinations 
of concrete objects…in compound experiences incapable of being 
disentangled.2 
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The adjective ‘involuted’ describes the relationship between the texts that inhabit the 
palimpsest as a result of the process of palimpsesting and subsequent textual 
reappearance. The palimpsest is an involuted phenomenon where otherwise unrelated 
texts are involved and entangled, intricately interwoven, interrupting and inhabiting 
each other. Another word that describes this structure is the neologism 
‘palimpsestuous’.  
The OED definition states that the adjective from ‘palimpsest’ is ‘palimpsestic’, 
meaning, ‘that is, or that makes, a palimpsest’. Recently, this official adjective has been 
rejected in favour of ‘palimpsestuous’.3 ‘Palimpsestuous’ does not name something as, 
or as making, a palimpsest. Rather, it is describes the complex (textual) relationality 
embodied in the palimpsest. Where ‘palimpsestic’ refers to the process of layering that 
produces a palimpsest, ‘palimpsestuous’ describes the structure that one is presented 
with as a result of that process, and the subsequent reappearance of the underlying 
script. De Quincey’s concept of the palimpsest made strange and revitalised 
palaeographic palimpsests. In the same way, ‘palimpsestuous’ makes that concept 
strange, and helps to rewrite and refigure the palimpsest in the context of late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century literary and cultural thought.  
 
 
Deconstruction: Thomas De Quincey and the Palimpsest of the Mind 
 
I will begin my exploration of the palimpsest by offering a reading of De 
Quincey’s inaugural use of this figure in constructing the notion of the palimpsest of the 
mind – a resurrective fantasy with which De Quincey attempts to secure the continued 
life of his sister Elizabeth. In contrast to previous commentators, I argue that the 
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thought of Jacques Derrida offers a way of understanding the post-romantic 
spectralisation of the self that arises from this fantasy, as well as the uncanny type of 
‘living on’ that De Quincey secures for Elizabeth with it. 
In his opening discussion of palaeographic palimpsests in ‘The Palimpsest’, De 
Quincey’s imagination is captured by the strange successful failure of the initial 
erasure, and the subsequent reappearance of the underlying script. As a result, De 
Quincey creates the fantasy of ‘the palimpsest of the human brain’: 
 
What else than a natural and mighty palimpsest is the human brain? Such a 
palimpsest is my brain; such a palimpsest, O reader! is yours. Everlasting 
layers of ideas, images and feelings, have fallen upon your brain softly as 
light. Each succession has seemed to bury all that went before. And yet in 
reality not one has been extinguished. (TDQ, 144) 
 
In Suspiria de Profundis (1845) (the fragmentary sequel to the Confessions of an 
English Opium Eater (1821), in which ‘The Palimpsest’ is collected), the figure of the 
palimpsest of the mind reassures De Quincey that all the impressions made on it ‘are not 
dead but sleeping’ (TDQ, 146). It confirms his belief – voiced twenty-four years earlier 
in the passage in the Confessions that prefigures ‘The Palimpsest’ – ‘that there is no 
such thing as forgetting possible to the mind’ (TDQ, 69). As such, it offers the 
reassurance that erasure and death, even if they appear permanent, can always be 
reversed – that nothing can properly and truly ‘die’. In the Suspiria, the construction of 
the mind as palimpsest functions specifically as one of a number of resurrective 
fantasies with which De Quincey attempts to secure the continued life of his sister 
Elizabeth. (Other such fantasies are the figure of the Spectre of the Brocken and the 
drowned city of Savannah-La-Mar.)  
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Of all the ‘mysterious handwritings of grief or joy which have inscribed 
themselves successively upon the palimpsest of…[his] brain’ (TDQ, 146), the 
‘intolerable grief’ of the loss of his sister Elizabeth haunts De Quincey most profoundly:  
 
the deep deep tragedies of infancy, as when the child’s hands were unlinked 
forever from his mother’s neck, or his lips for ever from his sister’s kisses, 
these remain lurking below all, and these lurk to the last. Alchemy there is 
none of passion or disease that can scorch away these immortal impresses. 
(TDQ, 146) 
 
The resurrective fantasy of the palimpsest of mind provides the assurance that Elizabeth 
is not dead, but sleeping. That in De Quincey’s mind, and through his writing, the ‘pall’ 
(not merely a dark covering but, literally, the cloth spread over a coffin or tomb) 
covering Elizabeth can be drawn off and revive the ‘sleeping’ Elizabeth beneath. In 
constantly making Elizabeth visible, De Quincey’s fantasies of resurrection are indeed 
both resurrective, and fantasies – the word fantasy, coming as it does, from the Greek 
phantasia, literally ‘a making visible’. De Quincey’s writing repeatedly performs this 
resurrection of Elizabeth; it continually enacts the impossibility of his forgetting of her.  
In ‘The Dark Interpreter and the Palimpsest of Violence: De Quincey and the 
Unconscious’ (1981), Robert M. Maniquis reads the palimpsest of the mind, and the 
other figures of the Suspiria, as De Quincey’s fictional autonomous psyches and 
explores the cycles of violence in which they are implicated. Maniquis is seeking to 
work through the complex connections between De Quincey’s multiple images of the 
psyche and Christian ideas of salvation and the Word, as well as psychoanalytic and 
linguistic concepts of the signifier and the signified. Maniquis argues that for De 
Quincey the palimpsest is a figure of the undying Romantic mind where no impression 
is ever erased. But he also draws attention to the palimpsest’s embodiment of the 
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paradox of Christian salvation – the creative violences involved in the process of 
palimpsesting resemble the creative violence of Christ’s sacrifice. Maniquis concludes 
his discussion of De Quincey’s palimpsest of the mind by briefly tracing its 
transmission into French literature. The figure has entered the writing of Gide, Proust 
and Genette, amongst others, via Baudelaire’s translation of De Quincey in Les paradis 
artificiels (1860). Maniquis halts the palimpsest’s journey suddenly and absolutely in 
the work of Jacques Derrida. Arguing that all a Derridean text can ever do is ‘reveal 
only its own constantly rupturing order’,4 he cites a passage from Derrida’s double text 
‘Living On: Border Lines’ (1979) as evidence of Derrida’s rejection of the concept of 
the palimpsest:  
 
An apocalyptic superimprinting of texts: there is no paradigmatic text. Only 
relationships of cryptic haunting from mark to mark. No palimpsest 
(definitive unfinishedness). No piece, no metonymy, no integral corpus. And 
thus no fetishism.5 
 
Maniquis argues that the palimpsest, as a figure of christological violence and 
resurrection, as well as of Romantic subjective totality, has no place in the writing of a 
‘postmodern writer’.6 For such a writer has rejected the idea of Platonic sources and 
considers himself to be only a shadow in a network of shadows, subordinate to the 
productive violence not of Christianity but of textuality. But attention to the French text 
of ‘Border Lines’ reveals that the phrase ‘no palimpsest’ translates ‘pas de 
palimpseste…’, which literally means both ‘no palimpsest’, and ‘a palimpsestuous 
step’.7 In contrast to Maniquis, I would argue that there is in fact a curious – perhaps, 
palimpsestuous – intimacy between the structure and logic of the palimpsest and 
Derrida’s ideas and formulations, particularly with regard to the subject and 
temporality.   
 9 
For instance, in De Quincey’s autobiographical writing, the fantasy of the 
palimpsest of the mind does not secure a Romantic unity of mind but is instead 
implicated in a distinctly post-Romantic spectralisation of the self, and of temporality, 
that is intimately related to Derrida’s theorisation of spectrality in Specters of Marx: 
The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (1994). In 
order to secure the fantasy of the palimpsest of the mind from the incoherence of the 
irrelatedness of the texts in vellum palimpsests, De Quincey posits the existence of 
‘organizing principles which fuse into harmony, and gather about fixed predetermined 
centres, whatever heterogeneous elements life may have accumulated from without’ 
(TDQ, 144). In the face of the irrelatedness and incongruity of the experiences, thoughts 
and feelings recorded in the layers of the brain, these principles do not merely defend 
against the convulsions that resurrect those layers. Rather, they define, create, and 
constitute the harmonious and coherent ‘grandeur of human unity’ (TDQ, 144) that is in 
need of such defence. These organizing principles are the interpretative powers of the 
inviolable ‘I’ of the human subject – their task is both to create and protect it. This ‘I’ is 
the narratorial subject position of any autobiographical writing, including De Quincey’s 
own. But from the very outset of the Suspiria, De Quincey acknowledges a disunity 
haunting the ‘I’ upon which autobiography, and the ‘grandeur of human unity’ (TDQ, 
144), depends. In fact, in the ‘Introductory Notice’, De Quincey recognises that 
autobiography is only possible precisely because of constitutive difference within the 
‘I’: ‘an adult sympathizes with himself in childhood because he is the same, and 
because (being the same) yet he is not the same’ (TDQ, 92). 
De Quincey’s doubled ‘I’ is not simply another manifestation of, in Gerald 
Gillespie’s words, ‘the Romantic fascination for the productive interplay between “self” 
and “otherness”’.8 Rather, in the Suspiria, these two selves rapidly multiply until the 
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unity of the self upon which De Quincey insists is ruptured by a distinctly post-
romantic realisation of the temporal contingency of human identity: 
 
Man is doubtless one by some subtle nexus that we cannot perceive, 
extending from the newborn infant to the superannuated dotard: but as 
regards many affections and passions incident to his nature at different 
stages, he is not one; the unity of man in this respect is coextensive only 
with the particular stage to which the passions belong. (TDQ, 107) 
 
The fantasy of the palimpsest of the mind, and the disunity of the self it implies, leads 
inexorably not just to a Romantic notion of the mirrored or doubled self, but to a post-
romantic notion of the spectralised subject. It represents the mind as a textual structure 
actively haunted by its encrypted traces. Despite the coherence that De Quincey’s 
interpretative ‘I’ is supposed to secure, the fantasy of the palimpsest of the human brain 
leads to a radical disjunction within the notion of identity, the self and the present, a 
disjunction theorised in Derrida’s Specters of Marx. For Derrida, the (spectral) subject 
can only be the effect of iterability, of a repetition that is never quite the same. Thus the 
‘I’ from which De Quincey is writing is at each moment a different ‘I’, spectrally 
constituted by all the ‘I’s that have preceded it and all the ‘I’s which it will become. 
This spectral structure of the self is also inevitably involved with a spectralisation of 
temporality. The palimpsest visibly represents what Derrida describes as the ‘non-
contemporaneity with itself of the living present’. 9 The ‘present’ of the palimpsest is 
only constituted in and by the ‘presence’ of texts from the ‘past’, as well as remaining 
open to further inscription by texts of the ‘future’. The presence of texts from the past, 
present (and possibly the future) in the palimpsest does not elide temporality, but 
evidences the spectrality of any ‘present’ moment which always already contains within 
it ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ moments. 
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 Furthermore, the idea of ‘living on’ which Derrida plays out in the companion 
text to ‘Border Lines’ shares its uncanny nature with the ‘living on’ that De Quincey’s 
fantasies of resurrection, including the palimpsest, hope to secure for Elizabeth. If De 
Quincey can not forget Elizabeth, if his writing can continually revive her, then 
Elizabeth can never really die. But the continued existence secured for her is not the 
Christian salvation of eternal life, about which De Quincey remains ambivalent. Rather, 
repeatedly resurrected and returning in his writing, preserved in the palimpsest of De 
Quincey’s mind, Elizabeth exists in the uncanny state of ‘living on’ described by 
Derrida as, 
 
a reprieve or an afterlife, “life after life” or life after death, more life or more 
than life, and better; the state of suspension in which [life is] over – and over 
again, and you’ll never have done with that suspension itself.10  
 
As I will elaborate in the following section, the structure of the palimpsest also 
embodies precisely the relationship of cryptic haunting to which Derrida alludes in the 
passage cited above from ‘Border Lines’. In fact, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s 
psychoanalytic theory of the crypt enables a refiguration of the figure of the palimpsest 
of the mind as a complex structure of cryptic incorporation. As such, I argue it has more 
in common with their redefinition of the psychoanalytic topography of the self, than it 
does with that of Freudian psychoanalysis, especially as represented in the model of the 
Mystic Writing-Pad with which the palimpsest has so often been erroneously 
associated.  
 
 
Psychoanalysis: The Cryptic Palimpsest vs. The Mystic Writing-Pad 
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In ‘Introjection – Incorporation Mourning or Melancholia’ (1980), Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok define fantasy as ‘any representation, belief, or body state 
working…toward the maintenance of the topographical status quo’.11 Fantasy thus has 
‘a conservative, preservative function, no matter how innovative in spirit it may be, how 
broad its field of action, or how great its hidden compliance with wishes’ (I, 3-4). The 
task of understanding a fantasy is specific: one must ‘pinpoint, concretely, what 
topographical change the fantasy is called on to resist’ (I, 4). The fantasy under 
discussion in ‘Introjection – Incorporation’ is the fantasy of ‘incorporation’, a fantasy 
that resists the psychical topographical changes that are the necessary consequence of 
‘normal’ mourning. The fantasy of incorporation magically bypasses this ‘normal’ 
process of mourning, named ‘introjection’. It does so by both performing and not 
performing it, ‘by carrying out in a literal sense something that has meaning only in a 
figurative sense’ (I, 5). In ‘Introjection – Incorporation’, Abraham and Torok explain 
that in the fantasy of incorporation ‘a thing or an object’ is introduced in whole or in 
part into the body, as a result of both the refusal to mourn a loss, and the refusal to 
acknowledge ‘the very fact of having had anything to lose’ (I, 7). All the words, scenes, 
tears and trauma of this loss, all the unexpressed grief, builds in the subject ‘a secret 
vault’ (I, 8): 
 
In this crypt reposes – alive, reconstituted from the memories of words, 
images, feelings – the objective counterpart of the loss, as a complete person 
with his own topography, as well as the traumatic incidents – real or 
imagined – that had made introjection impossible. (I, 8)  
 
De Quincey’s fantasies of resurrection, including the palimpsest of the mind, are part of 
his refusal to mourn his sister Elizabeth’s death ‘normally’. As a result, they create and 
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consolidate a crypt in his mind that shelters Elizabeth, and the trauma of her death. The 
palimpsest of the mind can therefore be understood as a structure of cryptic haunting in 
which Elizabeth ‘lives on’. Like the crypt – as Derrida describes it in ‘Fors: the Anglish 
Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’, the foreword to their The Wolf Man’s 
Magic Word: A Cryptonymy (1986) – it is ‘a topographical arrangement made to keep 
(conserve-hidden) the living dead’.12 
 The Wolf Man’s Magic Word is Abraham and Torok’s remarkable analysis of 
the subject of Freud’s famous case From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918 
[1914]) in which they employ and consolidate their theory of the crypt. One of the key 
insights of their text is that the notion of cryptic incorporation changes the traditional 
psychoanalytic topography of the self, for ‘the crypt works in the heart of the Ego as a 
special kind of Unconscious’.13 In Derrida’s elaboration, the crypt is ‘a place 
comprehended within another but rigorously separated from it’ (F, xiv), ‘a parasitic 
inclusion, an inside heterogeneous to the inside of the Self’ (F, xvi). This idea of cryptic 
incorporation provides a way of understanding the structure of the palimpsest (of the 
mind) that is not dictated by the psychical topography of Freudian psychoanalysis. For 
the palimpsest (of the mind), like the crypt, ‘no longer rallies the easy metaphors of the 
Unconscious (hidden, secret, underground, latent, other, etc.) of the prime object, in 
sum, of any psychoanalysis’ (F, xiii). The so-called ‘depth’ of the palimpsest which 
invites such metaphors is in fact illusory.14 Rather, the impressions made on the 
palimpsest (of the mind) live on as cryptic incorporations on its surface. The so-called 
‘underlying’ layer of the palimpsest is in fact, like the crypt, ‘a kind of “false 
unconscious,” an “artificial” unconscious lodged like a prosthesis, a graft in the heart of 
an organ, within the divided self’ (F, xiii).  
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The palimpsest does not conform structurally to a psychoanalysis of surface and 
depth, latent and manifest. The palimpsest of the mind is not structurally akin to Freud’s 
first stratified topography of the unconscious, preconscious and conscious systems. 
Rather, the palimpsest presents a complex structure of cryptic incorporation. The 
spectralisation of the self that results from this structure indicates that the palimpsest of 
the mind has more in common figuratively with Freud’s second topography, in which 
the mind is haunted by the ghostly figures of the Id, the Ego and the Superego. It is 
important to note at this point then, in contrast to previous critical commentary, the 
marked difference between Freud’s model of the Mystic Writing-Pad and De Quincey’s 
fantasy of the palimpsest of the mind.  
In ‘Writings on the Mind: The Importance of the Palimpsest in Nineteenth 
Century Thought’ (1987), Josephine McDonagh situates the palimpsest within ‘a wider 
tradition of psychological models of the mind’, specifically those of ‘the Empiricist’s 
tabula rasa and Freud’s Mystic Writing-Pad’.15 She notes that the difference between 
the tabula rasa on the one hand, and the Mystic Pad and the palimpsest on the other, is 
that the former lacks the capacity for the retention of the impressions it receives, 
whereas the latter retain those impressions. However, the only difference she identifies 
between the Mystic Pad and the palimpsest is that suggested by the limit Freud places 
on his analogy – the Mystic Pad cannot bring about the recollection of the memory 
traces, whereas the palimpsest can. Throughout ‘Writings on the Mind’, McDonagh 
discusses the model of the palimpsest, without reflecting upon either the idea of the 
model, or the strange substantivisation of the palaeographic palimpsest that occurs in 
the title of De Quincey’s essay. Like other commentators, McDonagh fails to recognise 
the significant difference in De Quincey’s essay between palimpsests and the 
palimpsest. Both the Mystic Pad and palimpsests may satisfy Freud and De Quincey’s 
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shared belief in the non-possibility of forgetting, in the permanence of the memory 
traces laid down in the mind. McDonagh may therefore indeed be surprised at Freud’s 
excitement about the novelty of the Mystic Pad, since ‘in its capacity to retain 
inscriptions while always providing a clean surface, a palimpsest already answers both 
Freud’s requirements [my emphasis]’.16 It may also be surprising that Freud does not at 
any point refer to palimpsests in his discussions of the mind, especially as he was 
undoubtedly aware of their existence.17 It may even be that such an omission is an 
absence symptomatic of Freud’s comprehensive elision of De Quincey from his 
writing.18 But this similarity between the model of the Mystic Pad and the potential 
model of the mind offered by palimpsests does not imply a necessarily corresponding 
similarity between the Mystic Pad and the fantasy of the palimpsest of the mind as it 
occurs in De Quincey’s essay.  
For De Quincey, the single most important fact about palimpsests and the 
palimpsest is that which Freud can do without in the model of the Mystic Pad – the 
possibility of recollection. The prime interest of palimpsests and the palimpsest for De 
Quincey is their implication in resurrection; their retentive function is merely a 
necessary means to that end. Moreover, the palimpsest is a fantasy in De Quincey’s 
writing, not a model. The Mystic Pad is the result of Freud’s life-long search for a 
technical model that will seriously represent his hypothesis of the psychical structure of 
the mind. ‘A Note upon the Mystic Writing-Pad’ (1925 [1924]) is an essay collected 
amongst others on the metapsychological theories of psychoanalysis. In contrast, De 
Quincey’s figure of the palimpsest of the mind occurs in an autobiographical text as a 
personal fantasy of resurrection. It is not a model of the mind but a delusive imagining, 
a hallucination, a daydream arising from De Quincey’s unconscious wishes and 
attitudes, an extravagant and visionary fancy, a product of the imagination, a fiction, a 
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figment, an ingenious invention.19 As such, the palimpsest is not an external model 
subject to the very limitation of modelling itself – that it will always remain an external 
representation, ‘a mechanism without its own energy’, a machine which is dead.20 
Rather, as a psychological fantasy, it shares in the undecidable status of all fantasies. It 
is somehow real and not real, both internal and external to the mind. It has a psychical 
reality that, however, does not preclude its material reality. As with all psychological 
fantasies, it blurs the very boundaries between internal and external, life and death, 
presence and representation by which Freud’s model of the Mystic Writing-Pad remains 
bound. 
 
 
Postcolonial Theory: The Palimpsest, Genealogy, History 
 
Reading De Quincey intertwined with modern theories of deconstruction and 
psychoanalysis allows a critical reinscription of the palimpsest, both in De Quincey’s 
writing, and more generally. At the same time, it highlights the way in which the 
structure and logic of the palimpsest inhabits the thought of these two contemporary 
critical discourses. In the last three sections of this essay, I would like to move away 
from De Quincey in order to explore the palimpsest’s significance in other areas of 
current critical inquiry, namely, postcolonial theory, feminism, and queer theory. 
Firstly, in this section, I will show how the concept of the palimpsest haunts Michael 
Foucault’s view of history, and the kind of historical postcolonial reading and writing 
that history requires.  
In ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971), Foucault elaborates, after Nietzsche, 
the concept of ‘genealogy’. In doing so, he reinscribes the traditional understanding of 
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the process of writing history. Integral to this reinscription is the refiguration of the 
subject of that writing – ‘history’ – as a collection of palimpsestuous documents: 
 
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a 
field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been 
scratched over and recopied many times.21 
 
In response to the palimpsestuous body of history, Foucault’s work outlines a new kind 
of historical reading and writing that combines the archaeological with the genealogical. 
These dual aspects of reading and writing correspond exactly to the dual responses to 
the palimpsest, what I term palimpsest reading, and palimpsestuous reading. 
 Traditional palimpsest reading has as its sole aim and objective the resurrection 
of the underlying script; the overlying one is irrelevant. In ‘Palimpsest Literature, And 
Its Editor, Cardinal Angelo Mai’ (1867), Charles William Russell notes this single-
mindedness of the palimpsest editor: ‘in a palimpsest MS. the chief, and perhaps the 
sole object of interest is the first or the more or less completely obliterated writing’.22 
Similarly, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 
(1980), Foucault explains that the task of the historian is ‘the making visible of what 
was previously unseen’ either by magnifying the detail of analysis, or by ‘addressing 
oneself to a layer of material which had hitherto had no pertinence for history and which 
had not been recognised as having any moral, aesthetic, political or historical value’.23 
For Foucault, archaeology involves bringing to light   
 
a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their 
task or insufficiently elaborate: naïve knowledges, located low down on the 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity. (PK, 82) 
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But, unlike palimpsest editors, Foucault recognises that archaeology must be combined 
with genealogy, with ‘the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local 
discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought 
into play’ (PK, 85).  
Genealogy traces the ‘strategic connections’ (PK, 38) between the discourses 
that have been brought to light. The task of genealogy ‘is not to discover the roots of 
our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation…to make visible all of those 
discontinuities that cross us’ (NGH, 162). Genealogy is thus a form of palimpsestuous 
reading that does not focus solely on the underlying text for to do so would be to 
unravel and destroy the palimpsest, which exists only and precisely as the involution of 
texts. Rather, such reading seeks to trace the incestuous and encrypted texts that 
constitute the palimpsest’s fabric. Since those texts bear no necessary relation to each 
other, palimpsestuous reading is an inventive process of creating relations where there 
may, or should be, none, hence the appropriateness of its epithet’s phonetic similarity to 
the incestuous.  
As the analysis of Herkunft, or descent, genealogy traces the intersection of 
marks that constitute the unravelable palimpsest that is individual and cultural identity. 
As an analysis of Entstehung, or emergence (current episodes, not culminations, in the 
historical series of subjections) genealogy works on the palimpsestuous body of history 
and ‘deals with events in terms of their most unique manifestations’ (NGH, 154). As 
such, traditional historical events such as ‘a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle’ 
(NGH, 154) come to be perceived in terms of shifting relationships of force and power. 
The task of genealogy is to draw attention to ‘the various systems of subjection’ (NGH, 
148) that constitute history as a violent and repeated palimpsestuous play of 
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dominations and forces, ‘substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and 
systematic reversals’ (NGH, 152). 
Foucault’s palimpsestuous view of history and its writing has had a significant 
impact on contemporary postcolonial theory, in which the palimpsest is used to figure 
the interpretation of culture and of history crucial to that discourse’s social and political, 
as well as literary critical, enterprise. The palimpsest – as both a literal agent of history 
that was appropriated by Western palaeographers from Eastern monasteries during the 
nineteenth century, and as metaphor – represents ‘history’ not as natural evolution or 
progress but as the history of colonial expansion, the violent erasure and 
superimposition of cultures, and defiant and subversive persistence. The palimpsest 
represents history as colonialism, the past as a series of oppressions and displacements, 
the struggle and vying for territory and existence. For example, in ‘Can the Subaltern 
Speak?’ (1988), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes the disqualified knowledges to 
which archaeology and genealogy respond as ‘the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative 
of imperialism’.24 In this essay, Spivak argues that the figuration of history as 
palimpsest, and the subsequent reading demanded by it, are important to postcolonial 
theory,  
 
not to describe “the way things really were” or to privilege the narrative of 
history as imperialism as the best version of history…[but] rather, to offer an 
account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the 
normative one.25  
 
Moreover, in ‘The Aztec Palimpsest: Toward a New Understanding of Aztlán, 
Cultural Identity and History’ (1988-90), Daniel Cooper Alarcón hesitantly and 
provisionally sets out the significance of the palimpsest as a tool and a trope that 
enables a critique and an understanding of cultural identity and history, both specifically 
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(in relation to Chicano identity and history) and generally. Importantly, Alarcón argues 
that 
 
the palimpsest’s structure of interlocking, competing narratives has the 
advantage of preventing the dominant voice from completely silencing the 
others, thus encouraging scholarship to recognize and consider diversity.26  
 
Scholars must not only listen to the previously silent or suppressed voices in history but 
analyse how such voices are interwoven with, speak in and through, infect and affect 
supposedly ‘dominant’ and ‘authoritative’ historical narratives. Alarcón represents 
culture and history as involuted palimpsests in which colonised and colonising 
discourses are interwoven, each affecting, infecting and inhabiting the other. This 
figuration avoids the tendency in postcolonial theory to ‘position colonial/imperial 
subjectivity as having epistemological and ontological primacy’ and to feature ‘native 
or subaltern subjects’ as ‘secondary “subject-effects” allowed, according to the critic, 
greater or lesser degrees of oppositional power within the discourse of empire’.27 This is 
not only because the palimpsest features colonised and coloniser’s discourses as 
interlocking, but also because it embodies the potential for future reinscriptions of the 
cultural and historical palimpsest, for shifts in the balances of power and force.28  
 
 
Feminism and Queer Theory: From the palimpsestic to the palimpsestuous 
 
The concept of the palimpsest inhabits contemporary theories of the self and 
temporality in deconstructive and psychoanalytic discourse, as well as current 
postcolonial understandings of history and culture. In addition to this, conflicting 
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understandings of the palimpsest also interestingly determine the opposed textual 
understanding and reading approaches of twentieth century Anglo-American feminist 
criticism on the one hand, and late twentieth century and early twenty-first century 
queer reading on the other. Discussions of the palimpsest within feminist criticism 
invariably occur in relation to the writing of the twentieth century poet and novelist 
H.D. For H.D.’s prose works are complex textual structures that combine autobiography 
and fiction, as well as heterosexual and homosexual texts. In entitling the first of these 
Palimpsest (1926), H.D. provides a name for such complex textual structures, and 
enforces a parallel between reading her work and reading palimpsests. Just as 
Foucault’s categories of archaeology and genealogy correspond to traditional palimpsest 
reading and a more radical palimpsestuous reading, the interpretative practices of 
traditional feminist criticism and of more radical queer reading also correspond to these 
two different reading methods.   
 The palimpsest reading practice of traditional feminist criticism is first given 
expression in Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s study The Madwoman in the Attic: 
The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (1979). 
Summarising their argument about the ‘odd’ narrative strategies of nineteenth century 
female writers, Gilbert and Gubar argue that, 
 
in short, like the twentieth-century American poet H.D., who declared her 
aesthetic strategy by entitling one of her novels Palimpsest, women from 
Jane Austen and Mary Shelley to Emily Brontë and Emily Dickinson 
produced literary works that are in some sense palimpsestic, works whose 
surface designs conceal or obscure deeper, less accessible (and less socially 
acceptable) levels of meaning. Thus these authors managed the difficult task 
of achieving true female authority by simultaneously conforming to and 
subverting patriarchal literary standards.29   
 
Gilbert and Gubar understand the structure of the palimpsest in terms of suppression 
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and oppression, of layering and superimposition. The task of feminist criticism is to 
uncover and bring to light the suppressed women’s narratives concealed within these 
texts. Such a project risks, however, ignoring or disregarding the overlying text of these 
narratives, as well as the complex relationality of the different texts which constitute 
their fabric. It is for this reason that Toril Moi fears that Gilbert and Gubar ‘end up at 
times in a dangerously reductionist position: under the manifest text, which is nothing 
but a ‘surface design’ which ‘conceals or obscures deeper, less accessible…levels of 
meaning’ (73), lies the real truth of the texts’.30 
The reductionist risks of Gilbert and Gubar’s approach – characteristic of that of 
Anglo-American feminist criticism in general – can be avoided by moving from a 
palimpsestic to a palimpsestuous understanding of the palimpsest and the texts it 
represents. This understanding is articulated by Shari Benstock in Women of the Left 
Bank, Paris, 1900-1940 (1986), again with reference to the writing of H.D. Here 
Benstock argues that the palimpsest is an entwined and encoded structure, not a layered 
one: 
  
An understanding of the palimpsest reveals that masculine and feminine 
myths, male and female “texts,” are not separate from each other, but 
entwined and encoded in each other by the very fact that they are culturally 
produced. There is not a second text (“a hidden meaning”) embedded in and 
enclosed by the parent figure and surviving like a nut inside the shell. The 
second text cannot be “lifted” from the parent text complete and whole to 
refute the premises of the primary text. Indeed, the notions of “primary” and 
“secondary,” “parent text” and “subtext,” “surface meanings” and “hidden 
meanings,” do not describe the operations of the palimpsest. Female 
experience cannot be extracted from the male experience, cannot be 
separately examined…; it is both indivisible from male experience and 
different from it. Indeed, in patriarchal societies, the “difference” of female 
experience is only known through its “indivisibility” from male cultural 
inscription.31 
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Benstock perceives that the palimpsest is not simply a layered structure which contains 
a hidden text to be revealed. Rather, it is a queer structure in which are intertwined 
multiple and varying inscriptions, in this instance, both male and female. Whereas the 
traditional understanding of the palimpsest corresponds to a reading approach that seeks 
only to uncover or reveal, this more complex understanding of the structure of the 
palimpsest requires a more radical queer palimpsestuous reading.  
Palimpsestuous queer reading does not uncover ‘hidden’ or ‘repressed’ 
narratives, but traces in the fabric of literary and cultural palimpsests the interlocking 
narratives of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, ‘heterosexuality’ and ‘homosexuality’ that 
characterise gender and sexual identity, writing, and culture. As such, it provides a 
reading method that can adequately respond to texts as complex and interwoven as 
H.D.’s, without reducing them to a single narrative, be it one of autobiography or 
homosexuality. Moreover, although H.D.’s texts are as complexly palimpsestuous as 
was her own sexual identity, emphasising the palimpsest’s significance as a textual 
figure circumvents this problematic autobiographical ‘phallacy’ of feminist criticism, 
for it is not the gender or orientation of the author which determines a queer reading, but 
the palimpsestuous queerness of texts themselves.  
 
 
Conclusion: Queering the Palimpsest 
 
In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the consequences of this 
palimpsestuous coupling of queer and the palimpsest, a union that draws attention to 
both the queerness of the palimpsest and the palimpsestuousness of queer. Identifying 
the structural similarities between the palimpsest and queer reveals that these terms 
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must remain open to reinscription if they are to remain viable critical currency, an 
openness precisely embodied in and by the palimpsest. 
In Queer Theory: An Introduction (1996), Annamarie Jagose provides a brief 
history of the word ‘queer’ in order to explain and contextualise its most recent 
semantic manifestation in the context of late-twentieth century poststructuralist thought. 
She explains that ‘while the mobilisation of queer in its most recent sense cannot be 
dated exactly, it is generally understood to have been popularly adopted in the early 
1990s’.32 She argues that poststructuralism’s problematising of identity has led to 
criticism of the terms ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ as identity categories and opened the space for 
‘queer’ as a model of difference not of identity. Jagose argues that ‘queer theory’s 
debunking of stable sexes, genders and sexualities develops out of a specifically lesbian 
and gay reworking’ of the poststructuralist figuration of identity.33 Jagose thus places 
the emergence of queer at the most recent end of the modern history of the decentring of 
the Cartesian subject, a history populated by such figures as Louis Althusser, Sigmund 
Freud, Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault. As I explore in my 
reading of De Quincey above, the palimpsest also takes a significant place in this 
history as a figure intimately related to the poststructuralist notion of the spectralised 
subject. ‘Queer’ and ‘palimpsestuous’ are therefore structurally comparable figures for 
the essential involutedness of identity, be it sexual, gender, or racial.  
Moreover, queer and the palimpsest share a similar aetiology. The construction 
of queer as an intellectual model has been made possible by the insights of lesbian and 
gay studies; the construction of the concept of the palimpsest by De Quincey’s essay 
and the subsequent figuration and refiguration of the palimpsest from 1845 to the 
present day. But both terms have been further realised in the context of what Jagose 
terms the ‘historically specific knowledges which constitute late twentieth-century 
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western thought’.34 Jagose demonstrates how this is the case in relation to ‘queer’. In 
my introduction and elaboration of the notion of ‘palimpsestuousness’ in this essay, and 
in my engagements with the palimpsest in relation to deconstruction, psychoanalysis, 
postcolonial theory, feminism and queer theory, I aim to have examined and performed 
this reinscription in relation to the palimpsest.  
In order for such concepts as palimpsestuousness and queer to remain critically 
effective, they must stay open to the possibility of further reinscription. Such is Judith 
Butler’s argument in a critical assessment of the term queer at the end of Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (1993). Here Butler insists of queer that 
 
if the term…is to be a site of collective contestation, the point of departure 
for a set of historical reflections and futural imaginings, it will have to 
remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only 
redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of 
urgent and, expanding political purposes.35 
 
Butler’s insistence applies as equally to the concept of the palimpsest as it does to that 
of queer. For both concepts are governed 
 
by the history of the usages that one never controlled, but that constrain the 
very usage that now emblematizes autonomy; by the future efforts to deploy 
the term against the grain of the current ones, and that will exceed the 
control of those who seek to set the course of the terms in the present.36  
 
The concept of the palimpsest is not only determined by, but structurally embodies, this 
historicity of critical terms, and their perpetual openness to critical and imaginative 
reinscription – an openness that is necessary for the exposure, affirmation and 
reworking of that historicity, as well as for the present and future effectivity of such 
critical terms.  
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The palimpsestuous coupling of queer and the palimpsest draws attention to both 
the queerness of the palimpsest and the palimpsestuousness of queer, not just as both 
these terms are applicable to descriptions of identity, but also as they can be extended to 
queer traditional understandings of history, identity, temporality, reading, writing and 
textuality. Identifying the queerness and queering power of palimpsestuousness points 
up its continuing capacity to reinscribe ‘otherwise’ traditional literary, critical, cultural 
and philosophical modes of thought.  
In concluding ‘The Dark Interpreter and the Palimpsest of Violence’, Maniquis 
asserts that ‘the palimpsest has suffered its own partial erasure and become only a 
remembered writing surface on which no more can be written’.37 This assertion is 
directly contradicted by Maniquis’ essay, which adds another text to the history of the 
palimpsest even whilst denying that possibility. It is also contradicted by the weight of 
texts he cites, both past and present, in which the palimpsest is continually rewritten. 
Finally, his assertion is undermined by this essay which provides undeniable evidence 
of the past, present and continuing importance of the palimpsest in modern literary and 
cultural theory. In seeming recognition of this, Maniquis’ final attempt to close down 
the palimpsest at the end of his essay is infected by unexpected expressions of 
uncertainty and possibility in relation to it, of expectations of the future event yet to 
come: 
 
Surely it [the palimpsest] will settle into some succeeding taxonomy of 
mental forms awaiting elaboration in our decentred culture…But whatever 
new rhetorics of figuration we may need, we know that few narrative and 
textual figures have claimed more ideological power than the circular route 
between the conscious and the unconscious in images such as the 
palimpsest. If that particular figure has drifted into the past, it is only 
replaced by others in a cultural power of figuration that, of course, has not 
weakened – and never will. [emphases added]38 
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The palimpsest has not drifted into the past and never could. For in its persistent 
figurative power and its theoretical adaptability it determines how we view the past and 
the present, and embodies within itself the promise of the future. 
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